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Introduction 
 
Brazil is a very vast country with an immense maritime territory that has proven to be able to 
become a global leader. Nevertheless, having relied on its soft power and its capacities to negotiate 
and discuss with other nations in order to rise on the global ladder, Brazil has neglected its hard 
power. But one might wonder why Brazil would need one to start with? Is it truly necessary to spend 
and invest money in the defense industry when there are other more pressing issues that need to be 
attended to? Brazil has “little reasons for a large military as it easily dominates its continent and 
neighborhood” (Sotero and Armijo, 2007: 45). If a country isn’t outwardly threatened by any direct 
and physical threat, having a particularly strong hard power can be perceived as unnecessary seeing 
that the military wouldn’t have to fight against a defined threat. However, today the threat of war 
isn’t the only threat that a country such as Brazil should defend itself against. On the subject of the 
Brazilian defense industry, Boris Martynov raises the question that needed to be asked: “Could Brazil, 
with its vast natural resources, growing population, burgeoning economy and impressive technology 
remain so poorly armed?” (2011: 29) This thesis will attempt to analyze how President Lula tried to 
rectify Brazil’s delay in the development of its hard power and the importance the strategic 
partnership with France has in this endeavor.  
The first chapter of this thesis will give an idea of the ongoing academic debate on Waever’s 
theory of securitization as well as on the term ‘smart power’ coined by Nye. The second chapter will 
explain how Brazil went from a regional power to a global player by primarily using soft power. The 
final chapter will focus on the strategic partnership established between France and Brazil and why it 
is crucial for Brazil’s quest in becoming one of the major actors in the international community.  
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Chapter 1 
Securitization and Hard Power: A Mutual Relation 
 
This chapter will first of all attempt to give a better understanding of what security is and 
how an issue becomes a security matter by using Ole Waever’s theory of securitization (Waever, 
1997). After having explained this theory as well as its strong points and shortcomings, this chapter 
will then focus on the terminology developed by Joseph Nye: soft power and hard power (Nye, 2004).  
In an age that seems to be dominated by terrorism, wars, poverty and sickness, and is 
monitored by social media, television and the internet, it is difficult to see and assert what issue 
should become a national or international priority and which one should be considered as a security 
matter. However, the concept of ‘security’, in addition to the ideas of ‘power’ or ‘identity’, isn’t only 
hard to define but also changes according to the context one chooses to use it in. The way that a 
security matter will be dealt with, on a national and international level, will differ according to the 
different actors involved. Usually, in order to resolve it, the main instrument used is hard power, a 
concept developed by Joseph Nye.  
1.1 Securitization within International Relations 
 Security is an abstract concept that can be interpreted in several ways and on many levels, 
whether it is at state, financial, personal or environmental level.  It could be argued that for a long 
time, in the field of International Politics, the understanding of security has been dominantly 
discussed from a realist point of view, limiting it to the security (i.e. the survival) of the state. 
However, security cannot solely be reduced to a realist, state centric approach. It needs to be 
widened in order to explore and incorporate other aspects of the latter. As Michael Williams states in 
his work on Securitization and International Politics, “the field (of International Politics) has been 
challenged to consider questions surrounding the broadening of its agenda to include threats beyond 
the narrow rubric of state and military security” (2003: 523). The Copenhagen School approached the 
idea of security in a more constructivist way, equipping scholars and politicians with a relatively new 
understanding of security, coined by Ole Waever in 1995: the theory of securitization.  
Waever explains that an issue should be securitized “when it is presented as posing an 
existential threat to a designated referent object. The special nature of security threats justifies the 
use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (1997: 21). The successful securitizing of an issue 
legitimizes any action the government may choose to undergo in order to resolve a potential threat 
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to national security. Waever claims that “the invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing 
the use of force” (Idem: 21). Nevertheless, in order to securitize an issue, three entities are 
indispensable: an actor, an object and an audience. As Waever underlines, “what is essential is the 
designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the 
acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (Idem: 27). Therefore, depending on how 
the actor will present this threat, the audience (i.e. usually the citizens) must accept it as such in 
order for it to be securitized.  
Over the years, the theory of securitization has been the subject of various criticism but the 
most recurrent one has been ‘the absence of ethic/moral goals of the theory’, an issue that both 
Michael Williams and Claudia Aradau mention in their respective works (Taureck, 2006: 56). To tackle 
this issue, Williams zooms into a particular aspect of the theory: societal security. He explains that, 
unlike the realist definition of security, societal security focuses on the preservation of the ‘identity’ 
and ‘the role that it plays in security relations’ (2003: 518). However, similarly to the concept of 
security, identity doesn’t have a single meaning or definition. A person, as well as society, can have 
several identities depending on how one approaches the subject. Williams argues, citing Bill 
McSweeny, that: 
“By defining society in terms of identity, the concept of societal security effectively defines 
society as having a single identity. […] By defining society as having an identity, and by 
defining societal security as the defense of this identity, the Copenhagen School risks 
fostering and legitimizing intolerance as well as encouraging and exacerbating securitizing 
dynamics between identity groups” (McSweeny, apud Williams, 2003: 519). 
Claudia Aradau goes further by accusing the theory of securitization of not being compatible 
with democratic policies, by arguing that ‘we cannot all be equal sharers of security’ (2004: 399). 
Aradau places the theory at an individual level by analyzing what consequences the securitization of 
an issue could have on a group of individuals. The state of securitization isn’t a normal one, it is an 
exceptional one that requires exceptional measures. It enables a powerful actor to declare a state of 
emergency and, once achieved, to implement measures that will benefit some to the detriment of 
others. The best example to illustrate this statement would be Germany under Hitler.  “Security re-
inscribes issues in a different logic, a logic of urgency and exceptionalism” (Idem: 392).  
However, Aradau’s main criticism of the Copenhagen School and the theory of securitization is the 
lack of attention towards de-securitization. De-securitization, as the term suggests, is the capacity to 
overcome a state of urgency and exceptionalism by reestablishing a normal state and privileging 
discussions and diplomacy. Securitization ‘suspends the usual democratic process’ whereas ‘de-
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securitization can be regarded as a political choice restoring democracy’ (Idem: 393). For Aradau, 
securitization is thus a negative element that would indisputably create instability within a group or a 
state and inequality between different individual entities. She adds that this instability is created by 
the actor as well as the analyst himself giving that “an inconsistency in the theorization of 
securitization reveals the impossibility to think of security only analytically, outside ay political 
project”, an idea echoed by Jef Huysmans.  
However, although Aradau’s goal was to criticize Waever’s theory and to point out its 
shortcomings, according to Rita Taureck, she doesn’t ask the right question. For Taureck, there has 
been a wide range of scholars, including Aradau and Huysmans, who misinterpreted or overlook 
what the theory of securitization truly is. It isn’t a political statement, as Aradau and Huysmans seem 
to imply, but just a ‘theoretical tool’ that answers the question ‘what does security do?’ not what 
security should be or not be’ (Taureck, 2009: 55). The role of this theory is to ‘facilitate actors’ 
analysis’ in order to grasp a better understanding of how to successfully securitize a dilemma and 
what this process depend on (Idem: 56). A ‘re-focusing’ towards its theoretical aspect seems 
necessary in order to not deviate from or misunderstand its original purpose. 
 However for this thesis, it is important to frame this theory in a specific context in order to 
have a more concrete idea of what type of security is being discussed: international security. 
International security focuses mainly on the survival of the state. In this security context as well there 
are various sectors: the military one, political one, economic one as well as the environmental one. In 
this thesis, the main focus will be on two of those: political-military one and the environmental one. 
The political-military one concerns the security of the state’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the 
environmental sector focuses on the survival of the environment itself. In Waever’s words, ‘this issue 
should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return, 
all the other issues will lose their meaning’ (1997: 38). As will be explained in the last chapter, Brazil 
is deeply attached to its bio-diversity and its ecological riches, which, as a result, places the 
protection of its environmental sector as one of the country’s top priorities. Despite the fact that 
illegal trafficking, pollution and destruction as a result of foreign entities have plagued the Amazon, 
there has to this date been no explicit political threat to Brazil’s sovereignty and maritime resources. 
However, in order to continue to defend the Amazon and to be able to dissuade any hypothetical 
foreign intervention, there has been an ongoing securitization process that takes the form of 
strategic partnerships with various countries.  
The idea of a hypothetical threat is developed by Andrej Zwitter and Jaap de Wilde, who add 
two new ‘explanations of securitizing moves’ to the theory: ‘abstract and prognosis’ and ‘comparison 
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and prognosis’ (2010: 2). For Zwitter and de Wilde, ‘what individuals in their social environment 
identify as risk or threat is learned by direct or indirect experiences’ which is then abstracted or 
compared and finally imagined (Idem: 9).This would ultimately trigger the ‘projection of a threat into 
the future as hypothetically and theoretically likely. (Idem: 16). In order for Brazil to be able to tackle 
current and potential threats, it has endeavored these past decades to further develop its hard 
power. 
1.2 The Tools of Power 
Similarly to the concept of security, the concept of power, can be understood in several 
different ways. Power is too often perceived in a realist way, which leads to the neglect or the 
overlook of other entities that could also be considered as powerful, a point made by Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall. According to them, when one mentions power, it is too often 
understood as ‘an actor controlling another to do what that other would not otherwise do’ (2005: 
39). Admittedly, since the beginning of time, power was judged based on physical strength and 
military power, which Joseph Nye labelled as hard power (2004: 5). The concept behind hard power 
is the idea that brutal force, usually reflected through military action, is what is needed in order to 
obtain what you want and/or to make someone else do something unwillingly. Hard power can be 
reflected through both military strength as well as economic power. However, the mass media, 
international law and globalisation have changed the meaning of power. It isn’t about ‘primitive’ 
force anymore.  
Mahatma Gandhi once said “Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of 
punishment and the other by acts of love. Power based on love is a thousand times more effective 
and permanent then the one derived from fear of punishment” (Sonnleitner, 1985: 22). Even though 
in this context, the idea of ‘love’ would be misplaced, the thought behind this is that another form of 
power that can be used is the image that one country has, its values, its reputation, its cultural aspect, 
etc. This would be the idea coined by Joseph Nye: soft power. He explains this by stating that it is 
“the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from 
the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye, 2004: 5). Even though it 
is obvious that military and nuclear power are still crucial in today’s world, a country’s power and 
influence go beyond this realist realm. It can be argued that, with the ascension of the BRICs and 
other emerging countries, the international system is transforming itself into a multipolar one, in 
which one’s economic growth, military strength and political stability are important as well as one’s 
capacity to indulge the role of global and/or regional leader. Iran, for example, seems to have all the 
requirements to be a powerful emerging country, in a realist sense. It has a large educated 
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population and enjoys a tremendous amount of natural gas and petroleum.  Even though, there is no 
doubt that Iran has an influence on the international energy security, its isolation in the Middle 
Eastern region and being perceived as a ‘meddling outsider’ by its neighboring countries limit its 
power on a global level (Warnaar, 2015: 1). Indeed, unlike Saudi Arabia which is more accepted in 
the region, since the Iranian Revolution Iran doesn’t have strong bilateral relations with its neighbors 
which prevents it to enjoy a solid regional platform to prove its leadership capacities and to propel its 
influence on the global level. As a result, Iran doesn’t have that power to become a significant pole in 
a multipolar system. However, Brazil, as will be explained more in detail in the next chapter, has a 
considerable amount of soft power which helped it grow as a nation and become the influential state 
that it is today. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that soft power alone is enough in 
order to acquire the necessary power to become a major global actor. Actually, what is needed is the 
combination of both hard power and soft power: smart power (Nye, 2011: 23). However, finding a 
balance and the appropriate use of these two powers is a challenge that even the world leader is 
struggling with. 
 In their respective works, both Tim Quirk and Ernest Wilson tackle the issue of unevenness of 
soft power and hard power in US foreign policy and how it has affected the US and its image abroad. 
In a country where gun lobbies are very strong and carrying a gun is a constitutional right, it is no 
secret that the US has been exerting and showing its power through its extensive use of its military 
and economic sanctions, especially under the Bush administration. The US has made sure to sustain 
its global hegemony by flexing its muscles, whether it is by waging wars, parading its armed forces or 
scattering military bases around the globe. “America has military capabilities second to none” 
(Cooper, 2004: 1). Being strong, powerful and ‘hard’ have been the main principles of the Bush’s 
administration, which led to the overuse of hard power in its foreign policies and consequentially the 
building of an ill reputation and its isolation from the rest of the world (Quirk, 2010: 1). Even though 
the world had shown an unprecedented amount of sympathy towards the US when 9/11 occurred 
and supported to a certain extent the war on terror, the war in Iraq and Bush’s rash disdain towards 
the UN triggered hostility and distrust from many countries on both a political and social level. 
Although the US does enjoy a certain amount of soft power that is conveyed through movies, social 
media or music, this impulsive and arrogant behavior on the part of the government has completely 
overridden US’ soft power and ridiculed its reputation as ‘an icon for democracy and justice’ (Zalman 
and Clarke, apud Quick, , 2010: 2). According to Quirk, “hard power should be a last resort. […] 
Ignoring soft power and jumping straight for hard power weaken all soft power efforts and 
consecutively hurts the US image abroad” (Idem: 2).  
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 In his article on “Soft Power versus Hard Power”, Daryl Copeland underlines that “hard 
power engenders fear, anguish and suspicion. Soft power flourishes in an atmosphere of confidence, 
trust and respect” (Copeland, 2010: 1). However, for a long time soft power seems to have been 
unfairly overlooked. But since the turn of the millennium, the number of countries that are re-
adjusting their foreign policy tactics have increased, including those that harbor aggressive and 
militaristic reputations such as China. China has been perceived as a potential threat by its neighbors 
and other nations. In order to counter this reputation and to deepen its regional integration, China 
promoted a ‘peaceful rise’ policy that “states that China will develop economically by taking 
advantage of the peaceful international environment, and at the same time maintain and contribute 
to world peace by its development” (Pan, 2006: 2). Even though this campaign had mixed results, 
China did take a step forward towards the right direction in this attempt of improving its smart 
power by using ‘the full range of instruments of national power’, which is something that the US, as 
the global leader, needs to learn to do (Wilson, 2008: 112). In the US, as in many advanced countries,  
“The allies of hard power are much more numerous, visible and powerful than their soft 
power counterparts. The firm advocates of the latter and its wider introduction into foreign 
policy making exist as scattered public intellectuals in various think tanks and universities or 
the occasional consulting group”(Idem: 119). 
 Using this concept as a tool to wield power can be difficult, however it appears that since Obama 
took office in 2009, ‘global perception held of the US changed drastically’ (Quirk, 2010: 3). Indeed, 
unlike the Bush administration, Obama changed his rhetoric on war, promoted important social 
changes such as same-sex marriage, and privileged diplomacy and discussion over aggression. 
Although the US still suffers from a negative image abroad, its attempt to find a right balance 
between hard and soft power to ultimately create a ‘coalition that crosses political parties and links 
experts from the ‘two cultures’, military/national security and public/traditional diplomacy and 
global affairs’ has relatively contributed to the improvement of its foreign relations (Wilson, 2008: 
121).  
 Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, Ole Waever’s theory on securitization as well as Joseph Nye’s 
theory on hard power, and by extension smart power, are theories that have proven to be solid 
theoretical tools that have helped politicians to shape their policies and decisions. However, as other 
theories before them, they both need to be improved and updated so that they also take into 
account the important changes that have occurred in the past two decades. In the case of 
securitization, it is crucial to tackle the ethical issues it has been accused of and to further elaborate 
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the idea of de-securitization which could simultaneously help develop countries’ soft power. As for 
hard power and soft power, even though most countries have understood that hard power alone 
doesn’t guarantee hegemony, it is essential to find the right balance between both ‘cultures’. As 
mentioned above, the US’ main tool is hard power, but Brazil, as explained in the following chapter, 
has almost exclusively favored soft power in its foreign policies to the detriment of its hard power.  
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Chapter 2 
From a Regional Power to a Strong Global Player 
 
 The first part of this chapter will focus on how Brazil has solidified its position as a regional 
power and leader in South America. The second part will underline its ascension as a global player, 
notably as one of the key emerging economies (BRICs). Finally, the third part will attempt to explain 
the particular bond between France and Brazil.  
“The 19th century was the Age of Europe, the 20th was the American Age, and the 21st will be the Age 
of Brazil.” (Martynov, 2011: 25) This claim made by President Lula in 2005 left, as Boris Martynov 
pointed out, many people skeptical. How can a country such as Brazil that has been through, and still 
is going through, many social problems and that was still a dictatorship less than 40 years ago 
become a significant global actor today? Since its independence, Brazil has seen itself transform and 
go through several different identities. It went from a newly independent state to an Empire, to a 
republic, to a dictatorship (1964-1985), to finally come back and to thrive as a democratic regional 
power. In order to better understand and assess Lula’s claim 10 years ago, it is important to focus on 
Brazil’s historical background and how it has managed to become not only the regional leader of 
South America but also an increasingly important actor on the international stage. This new status 
that Brazil has acquired this past decade, coupled with its strong willingness to keep its autonomy 
from the United States, has led to a renewed flourishing of a Franco-Brazilian relations.  
2.1 Brazil: The Regional Leader 
 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that ‘the Federative Republic of Brazil shall seek the 
economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, viewing the 
formation of a Latin-American community of nations’ (Brazilian Constitution, 1988).  Brazil is a nation 
of over 204.000.000 people, is the fifth largest country in the world, the most important Latin 
American partner for the European Union, has vast and extensive natural resources and is home to 
the greatest rain forest. However, what helped elevate Brazil as a regional leader, in addition to 
these data and its desire to form a Latin American community, is its three main guidelines in foreign 
policy: autonomy, universalism and destiny (Gardini and Lambert, 2011: 53). Following these 
guidelines and in order to fulfill this sense of destiny that seems to be engrained in Brazil’s political 
and military mindset, Brazil aimed to elevate South America as an independent region, i.e. by 
impeding the US to meddle into their regional affairs, and also by using a solid principle that isn’t 
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always seen in bilateral or regional relations. Indeed, unlike many countries, whether they are 
emerging ones or already powerful ones, Brazil makes sure to ‘operate through reciprocal 
multilateral relations so that it benefits every nation’ (Cervo, 2010).  This idea of quid pro quo has 
helped Brazil to not only be seen in a favorable light and to gain the trust of its neighboring countries, 
but it has also contributed to solidifying good bilateral relations with them and thus guaranteeing its 
position as a regional power. Nevertheless, in order to fully grasp Brazil’s role in the region, it would 
be interesting to lean on the following question: what is a regional power? Is it simply the country 
that has the most important economy or military strength? As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
nowadays power isn’t reduced to merely hard power but it is a combination between both soft 
power and hard power (i.e. smart power) (Nye, 2011: 23). In a workshop on regional powers given in 
Helsinki on the 10th to the 12th of May 2007, Professor Joachim Betz and Professor Ian Taylor explain 
that a regional power is  
“a state belonging to a geographically defined region, dominating this region in economic 
and military terms, able to exercise hegemonic influence in the region and considerable 
influence on the world scale, willing to make use of power resources and recognized or even 
accepted as the regional leader by its neighbours.” (Taylor and Betz, 2007) 
If one goes by this definition, a regional power is thus not only a country that is powerful in a realist 
sense but is also a country that is ‘willing to act as a leader’, has ‘leadership capacities’ and is 
accepted as the leader by other actors’ (Van Langenhove and Zwartjes 2013, apud Viegas, 2013: 24 & 
Pinheiro and Gaio, 2013: 4). In the past two decades, Brazil has successfully managed to do so, 
despite some occasional tensions that occurred from time to time, especially with Argentina 
(Malamud, 2009: 9). Indeed, once Argentina was defeated in the Falkland war and Brazil became 
once again a democracy in the 1980s, Brazil has become the main power of South America. It then 
proceeded in creating regional institutions, such as Mercosur and later Unasur, with the idea of 
unifying the region and to make it more independent vis-à-vis the US, which would increase Brazil’s 
influence and autonomy as well. Brazil “leads its partners in the creation of this union in order to 
combine trade liberalization with regional political and security coordination” (Armijo and Burges, 
2010). The foundation of these institutions although it took a while at first, not only helped South 
America, a region that was once torn by dictatorships and border issues, to make a considerable leap 
forward both politically and economically, but it also led Brazil to elevate itself as the leader of the 
continent.  
 Therefore, Brazil saw its regional relations improve dramatically especially under the 
presidency of Lula. Although President Cardoso did contribute in building the region as well, he had a 
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tendency of turning towards the US and other advanced countries. President Lula was the first leader 
to properly make a stance and to orient his gaze towards the South, which consequently led to the 
long-awaited creation of UNASUR (Viegas, 2013: 42). Gardini and Lambert explain that UNASUR, 
unlike MERCOSUR that was created by Brazil and Argentina, was a ‘Brazilian creation’ and is the 
“result of Brazil’s vision to create ‘South America’ as a cohesive and politically active community” 
(Gardini and Lambert, 2011:243). Nevertheless, every political ambition has an agenda behind it that 
will benefit the state. Indeed, the creation of UNASUR and MERCOSUR gave a ‘platform’ for Brazil as 
the regional representative ‘to boost its claims to international power’ (Idem: 238). Nevertheless, 
even though it can be argued that having this ‘platform’ and becoming the natural regional leader of 
South America gave Brazil the legitimacy to develop from a regional power to a significant global 
actor, there has been other factors that contributed to Brazil’s ascension, notably the BRICs. 
2.2 The Creation of a Global Network 
 Brazil has in mind to be an active participant in the transformation of the international 
system from a unilateral one to a multilateral one. However, Brazil also wants to be on the front line 
and to be recognised as a world leader that deserves its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. 
In order to achieve this objective, Brazil, especially under Lula’s presidency, has managed to expand 
its relations around the globe and to work in several different contexts whether it is bilateral, 
regional or multilateral. Unlike his predecessor, Lula has endeavoured in ‘forming alliances’ (Vigevani 
and Cepaluni, 2007: 1316) and to turn its focus towards ‘Southern’ countries (which in this context, 
broadly encompasses all the non-western states). Another characteristic that separates Brazil from 
other emerging states or powerful ones, is its efforts to use soft power instead of hard power.  In his 
work, Jorge Luis Mialhe claims that « le Brésil a toujours privilégié la diplomatie et le dialogue direct 
dans ses relations internationales, se distinguant par conséquent des politiques de puissances 
affichées par les Etats centraux » (2011: 21).  This predominant use of soft power, its economic 
growth, coupled with Brazil’s involvement in many international affairs, notably in UN Peacekeeping 
missions, led Brazil to be part of important groups such as IBSA or BRIC. By being associated and 
working with major emerging powers, such as China, India and Russia, propelled Brazil in the front 
row of the international stage. However, in order to ensure its present and future influence, Lula 
made sure that Brazil did not only associate itself to global powers in order to pull itself at the top, 
but also tried to help and push ‘third world countries’ in their economic and political developments. 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães states that “Brazil has to articulate political, economic and technological 
alliances with the countries of the periphery of the international system to promote and defend its 
interests” (2006). In an international system that has often been claimed as ‘asymmetrical’, where 
developing as well as poor countries are ‘spectators at best’, Brazil has decided to attempt to 
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counterbalance US’ omnipotence and hegemony and to give a voice to the numerous countries on 
the ‘periphery’ (Cervo, 2010: 7). In order to climb the ladder of the international scale and to gain as 
much influence as possible, it is important for Brazil to gain the support of these countries due to 
their significant number and to consequently establish itself as ‘the leader of the South’ (Santander, 
2011: 43). With this aim in mind, Lula invested a considerable amount of time and effort in 
(re)establishing diplomatic and economic relations with several African countries and to position 
Brazil as a development assistant in Africa’s fight against hunger, poverty and aids. Even though 
Brazil claims that helping Africa is seemingly disinterested, it never forgets its principle of the quid 
pro quo. As Sebastian Santander points out: “les autorités brésiliennes sont conscientes que leurs 
programmes d’aide au développement peuvent constituer un formidable instrument de visibilité et 
de reconnaissance internationales pour leur pays” (idem : 38). Indeed, by becoming one of Africa’s 
main partners and assistants, Brazil shows its global leadership abilities by getting involved in one of 
the areas in the world that enjoys many natural resources but that is also victim of so many plagues, 
to the point that it was seen for a long time as a lost cause. Therefore, in addition to using the region 
of South America as a platform in order to gain influence and weight in the international hierarchy, 
Lula has successfully managed to add another dimension and simultaneously another objective to 
Brazilian foreign policy (Spektor, 2010: 38). However, having as much influence and presence as 
possible isn’t enough to transform its status from an emerging power to a major global actor. Many 
other factors are needed in the equation such as a strong military, a growing economy, and a stable 
society but also advanced technology. In order to develop its technological power as fast as possible, 
Brazil didn’t hesitate to turn to already established powerful countries, notably France.  
2.3 Brazil and France: Beyond a Political Relationship 
 The link between Latin America and Europe is undeniable. In addition to the obvious 
common commercial interests that exist between both regions, as Federica Mogherini, the High 
Representative and Vice President of the EU pointed out at the EU-CELAC summit in 2015,  
“The people of Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe have a long history of common 
aspirations…nowadays, we share a wish for peace and prosperity that our cultural and 
historical roots have helped to strengthen from generation to generation” (EU-CELAC Summit, 
2015). 
 Although the United States did, to a certain extent, ‘replace’ Europe in a political and economic way, 
the latter will always enjoy a privileged bond. However, in order to have a better and broader 
understanding of the following chapter, it is important to zoom in to the relation between two 
powers of these regions: France and Brazil.  
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 France doesn’t only share an extensive border with Brazil and common Latin roots, but it also 
happens to be historically, economically and culturally linked. Historically speaking, France was one 
of the first powers of the time to recognize Brazil as an independent state in 1825. In the twentieth 
century, similarly to what it has been undergoing with Brazil this past decade, France has helped 
Brazil to modernize its army (Martins, 2014: 169). But their relation runs deeper than mere political 
facts. In the article on French and Brazilian bilateral relation on the Itamaraty website, it is explained 
that: 
“Desde a Independência, a França ocupa posição central na formação cultural, intelectual e 
institucional brasileira. Foram buscadas naquele país ideias políticas, filosóficas e religiosas, 
assim como modelos escolares, universitários e militares que seriam empregados no Brasil.” 
(Relações bilaterais, Itamaraty) 
Indeed, from a more constructivist point of view, there has been a mutual cultural respect between 
both nations since at least the 19th century that contributed in the solidification and the deepening of 
their relation. This cultural respect was especially shaped thanks to “le contact entre les littératures 
brésilienne et française qui fut particulièrement intense pendant le 19e et 20e siècle” (Jones Corrêa, 
2009). This literary contact was made possible mostly by Baptiste-Louis Garnier who was « un des 
plus importants libraires et éditeurs français au Brésil. […] Il investit aussi dans les auteurs brésiliens 
développant et valorisant l’impression de livres brésiliens en France” (Bessone, 2009). In addition to 
these shared cultural values, Brazil and France also share political and diplomatic values vis-à-vis the 
international system. On December 11 2012, these shared values that tie them together were 
reiterated by President Hollande and President Rousseff:  
“La France et le Brésil, attachés aux valeurs démocratiques et aux droits de l’Homme, 
souhaitent également promouvoir leur vision commune d’un ordre international plus 
prospère et plus juste et d’un système multilatéral plus efficace et plus représentatif, dans un 
monde culturellement diversifié où prévalent le droit international et la défense de la paix et 
de la sécurité.”(Déclaration conjointe du Président Hollande et Présidente Rousseff, 2012) 
This vision of a multilateral and equal (as much as it can possibly be) world system that they both 
foster and desire to promote is one of the main foundations of their current relation, which is why 
France supports Brazil on its quest of obtaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.  
 Nevertheless, their relationship and friendship took another step forward in 2006 with the 
emission of the idea of a strategic partnership, which predominantly touches the fields of armament 
and defense, between President Chirac and President Lula and was signed two years after between 
President Sarkozy and President Lula. Through this partnership, France officially recognizes Brazil as a 
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global actor, a trustworthy nation and a reliable partner in global and bilateral affairs. This strategic 
partnership has several objectives that will be discussed in the next chapter. However, it is important 
to point out that President Lula turned towards France in the construction of these submarines and 
not to the United States, a point that will be developed in the next chapter. As a result, Brazil 
continues to have a multidimensional approach to foreign relations which reduces its dependence 
towards the US, increases its global autonomy and makes it, in 2009, “le premier client de la France 
en matière d’équipements de défense” (Rapport D’Information n662, Juin 2011). This transfer of 
savoir-faire from an ‘old’ power such as France to a new emerging country is one of the first steps 
towards the transformation of the international system as well as the emergence of a new 
‘generation’ of major powers in a multilateral world.  
Conclusion 
 To conclude this chapter, the continuity that appears to prevail in Brazilian foreign policy 
since the end of the military regime combined with President Lula’s eagerness to multiply and 
deepen Brazil’s relations with as many countries as possible has proven to be successful seeing that it 
permitted Brazil to become an indispensable and sought-after partner today. Even though its 
‘characteristics’ as a nation, i.e. population, economic growth and political stability, contributed to 
Brazil’s growing importance on the international stage, its successful management of its region and 
establishment as regional leader gave Brazil the validation it needed in order to ascend to the ‘next 
level’. Indeed, Brazil’s proven leadership skills, its growing regional and consequentially global 
diplomatic and political influence, its persistent involvement in international issues, as well as its 
rapid development, led Brazil to be included in new multilateral groups such as the BRICs. Its 
membership in this group and the label as a rapidly emerging country gave Brazil a new global image 
and importance. It is no secret that Brazil has been mainly using its soft power to promote itself both 
politically and culturally throughout the world. But how about its hard power? In an age where 
technology dominates and natural resources are becoming scarcer, it is imperative for any nation 
that wishes to turn into a main pole of the international system to have advanced technology and 
also to participate in its development. This is why the strategic partnership made with France is of 
vital importance for France as well as Brazil and its endeavor in the fulfillment of its ambitious 
political agenda.  
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Chapter 3 
Dissuasion and Development: two crucial keys to fulfill Brazil’s global ambitions 
 
This chapter will first begin by explaining the concept of the Blue Amazon and its importance 
for Brazil. The second one will focus on the South Atlantic region as a platform for Brazil to exert its 
leadership skills and why it is thus necessary for Brazil to develop its hard power. The final part will 
give a better understanding of what the strategic partnership with France consists of and how it 
benefits both countries.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been rapidly changing, making it crucial for 
those who wish to play an important role in it to keep up with it. This last decade, Brazil has proven 
to have the determination and the means to become one of those major global players but there are 
still many steps that it needs to achieve in order to evolve from an emerging country to a ‘developed’ 
one. Although President Cardoso has been the instigator of important national reforms and has 
developed crucial relations with powerful countries, President Lula made sure to propel Brazil to the 
front row and diversify its relations. In order to do so, he turned his attention towards Brazil’s 
defense strategy and the features it was lacking. Brazil has a very strong soft power but lacks in hard 
power. Therefore, a balance needed to be established, which is why Lula decided to not only have an 
official Brazilian National Strategy of Defense (BNSD) written down but also to determine strategic 
partnerships with other states. The definition of a strategic partnerships, being a relatively new 
concept in international relations, is still unclear.  Nevertheless, in order to have a framework, this 
thesis will be based on Luis Blanco’s idea of the latter. He states that “since ‘strategic’ is something 
conducted with the aim at reaching goals considered to be vital, a strategic partnership could be 
understood as cooperative relationship between parts that share the desire to reach common high-
priority goals” (Blanco, 2001: 1). This chapter will focus on the following question: To what extent is 
the strategic partnership with France and the modernization of Brazil’s navy important for Brazil’s 
ascension and global autonomy?  
3.1 The Securitization of the Blue Amazon and its Resources 
Being home to most of the Amazon rainforest, Brazil is known to have an immense amount 
of natural resources within its border. The preservation of these natural resources and bio-diversity 
in a crucial geostrategic area pushed Brazil to make considerable efforts to be able to protect it from 
pollution but also from foreign intervention. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has been 
an ongoing fear in the Brazilian mindset, as well as in its politics, that Brazil needs to be a strong 
developed country that is capable of preventing foreign intervention on its soil. According to the 
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Brazilian constitution the government, and by extension the military, has the mission to maintain law 
and order but also to protect the country from foreign threats. Until 1989, the foreign threat has 
predominantly been alleged communism, but since the end of the Cold War, a new threat needed to 
be defined in order to give a strong purpose to the military (Martins and Zirker, 1998: 14). Having 
been at peace for over a century, the only foreign threat that seems to exist was the illegal 
exploitation of the Amazon by other nations or foreign companies. Nevertheless, in the past decade, 
the attention has been shifting from the ‘Green’ Amazon to the ‘Blue’ Amazon. As Dr Wiesebron 
describes it, «L’Amazonie bleue renferme au moins autant de richesses , sinon plus, avec le pétrole, 
le gaz, et les minerais et toute la biodiversité de l’Océan qui n’ont pas encore été bien explorés, 
exploités ou protégés, selon les cas » (2011 : 45). Although Brazil has focused its attention for many 
years inland, the Ocean has always been extremely important for the Brazilians for historical reasons, 
as Adriana Abdenur points out, and commercial reasons, seeing that it has ‘a costa mais extensa de 
todos os paises que beiram o Atlântico Sul’ (2014: 8). Nevertheless, the discovery of pre-salt off its 
shores has increased the stakes and the geopolitical importance of the Blue Amazon. Bruno 
Muxagato and Bruna Le Prioux state that « les gisements identifiés contiendraient de 10 à 15 
milliards de barils, mais la zone totale du pré-sal pourrait en contenir de 50 à 80 milliards. […] Avec le 
pré-sal, le Brésil pourrait devenir à moyen terme un des principaux producteurs mondiaux d’or noir » 
(2011 : 97). By becoming self-sufficient in energy, Brazil has added a new card to its hand. In addition 
to being a political and economic power, it now can identity itself as a potential energy power in the 
near future. Muxagato and Le Prioux claim that « le fait que le Brésil puisse devenir une puissance 
pétrolière pourrait contribuer à changer l’image de celui-ci et sa position sur l’échiquier mondiale » 
(2011 : 98). 
“A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa pauta-se pelas seguintes diretrizes: Dissuadir a 
concentração de forças hostis nas fronteiras terrestres e nos limites das águas jurisdicionais 
brasileiras, e impedir-lhes o uso do espaço aéreo nacional. […] A Marinha deverá estar mais 
presente na região da foz do Rio Amazonas e nas grandes bacias fluviais do Amazonas e do 
Paraguai-Paraná.” (BNSD, 2008: 4) 
 In the 21st century, there have been many recurrent subjects that have become increasingly 
problematic and that have turned into global security issues. Usually, the first term that comes to 
one’s mind when the subject is broached is terrorism. Nevertheless, the other major threat that 
humanity is facing and will have to face even more in the future is that of the scarcity of natural 
resources. With global warming getting worse and the fear that water will become the major 
problem of our century, the countries that are self-sufficient and possess vast amounts of natural 
resources worry that they will be vulnerable to a forced redistribution of those natural resources by 
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super-powers in general, but by the US specifically. This fear has already been present in Brazil due to 
the interest aroused by the Amazon, as explained above, but it has become more present with the 
fulfillment and the discoveries of the Blue Amazon that, according to Daniel Besson, “possède plus de 
potentialités que l’Amazonie terrestre tant sur le plan des ressources minières que des ressources 
biologiques et que le Brésil doit se doter des moyens nécessaires pour la défendre” (2010: 2). This is 
an argument that Boris Martynov evokes on his work on Brazil as an emerging power by comparing it 
to another emerging BRIC power: Russia. Similarly to Brazil, Russia is as well self-sufficient and enjoys 
many natural resources within its borders, notably drinking water. The violation of its sovereignty by 
other countries in order to redistribute their national wealth in terms of natural resources, in the 
name of solidarity, is an ongoing plausibility. Brazil has “to prepare itself for impeding attempts at 
redistribution of global resources” (Martynov, 2011: 29).  
In addition to the protection of Brazil’s maritime sovereignty from foreign forces, Brazil also 
faces a phenomenon that has been increasing through the years: hydro-piracy. With water 
increasingly becoming a major issue for several countries around the globe, coupled with the 
competitive prices companies are desperate to achieve, the frequency of ships illegally pumping 
drinking water from the mouth of the Amazon has increased. The Amazon River being “a maior bacia 
existente na Terra”, in his article on the subject, Chico Araújo explains that 
“conforme a revista jurídica Consulex 310, a captação geralmente é feita no ponto 
que o rio deságua no Oceano Atlântico. Estima-se que cada embarcação seja 
abastecida com 250 milhões de litros de água doce, para engarrafamento na Europa 
e Oriente Médio. Diz a revista ser grande o interesse pela água farta do Brasil, 
considerando que é mais barato tratar águas usurpadas (US$ 0,80 o metro cúbico) do 
que realizar a dessalinização das águas oceânicas (US$ 1,50)” (2010: 1). 
 The importance that the two Amazons has today will surely increase in the decades to come 
due to the problem of water insufficiency, giving it a more strategic importance than it already has. 
Seeing that “63,88% das águas que formam o rio se encontram dentro dos limites nacionais”, Brazil 
needs to be able to protect its sovereignty, its bio-diversity and its vulnerabilities by having enough 
hard power to dissuade these external entities that do represent current threats (Idem: 6). However, 
Brazil’s maritime ambition does not limit itself to the Blue Amazon. Its ambition goes beyond it, all 
the way to the African coast on the other side of the Atlantic.  
3.2 Brazil in the South Atlantic Region 
With the goal of strengthening South-South relations and augmenting Brazil’s weight on the 
international stage in mind, Lula has endeavored to develop the South Atlantic region and its regional 
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identity. As explained by Abdenur, “Frente a um cenário em que o Atlântico Sul assume nova 
importância geopolítica, tanto para os atores da região quanto para os de fora, o Brasil utiliza a 
cooperação para promover a construção de uma identidade regional que começa a alterar as 
relações de poder nesse espaço” (2014: 5). However, it’s important to point out that the idea behind 
the establishment of the South Atlantic isn’t to create another NATO, i.e. a military alliance, but to 
create a zone of peace and cooperation dubbed South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone 
(ZOPACAS). When it was first created in 1986, on Brazil’s initiative, the UN declaration underlines 
that the South Atlantic region is first of all a nuclear-free zone, in which ‘regional co-operation for 
economic development and peace’ (as well as environmental care) are promoted and encouraged 
(Resolution A/RES/41/11, 1986). It can be argued that the importance of this zone today has grown 
dramatically due to the environmental issues that have persisted and worsened during these past 
twenty-nine years but also due to the fact that, as Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad points out, “the peace 
dividend appears to be slipping from within the grasp of the international community. International 
peace and stability continues to be threatened by events in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
the Iranian nuclear issue” (Address to the 6th Ministerial Meeting of ZOPACAS, 2007). As the initiator 
and the main country of ZOPACAS, Brazil needs to further develop its hard power in order to 1) 
discourage any other advanced nations that are not part of the zone, specifically the US and the UK 
that both have military bases in the South Atlantic, to try to exert its influence or to meddle in the 
region and 2) to insure the security of commercial transactions as well as the preservation of the 
maritime environment, especially in the Blue Amazon (Wiesebron, 2013: 115). This necessity to 
rapidly develop defense technology in order to be truly autonomous and stronger has compelled 
Brazil to “sign strategic partnerships in the defense area with several countries: Germany, Italy, 
Russia and the US. However, […] the partnership with France is considered the most elaborate and 
crucial” (Idem: 112).    
3.3 The Strategic Partnership with France 
“Whoever doesn’t master critical technology is neither independent for defense nor for 
development” (BNSD, 2008). Lula is known for predominantly resorting to soft power in the 
management of foreign affairs and to mainly focus on internal issues, i.e. ‘social and economic 
components of national security’, which led to the overlooking of the ‘military’ component. 
(Martynov, 2011: 30) In order to improve the critical situation of the Brazilian armed forces, Lula 
decided to spend at least ‘2.5% of the annual GDP on military equipment’ to modernize it and to gain 
additional power on the international stage (Harig, 2013: 36). Brazil, being first of all a peaceful 
country, values discussion over aggression, a point made in the BNSD: “Brazil shall rise to the first 
stage in the world neither promoting hegemony nor domination” (BNSD, 2008). But, in a world 
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where ‘intimidation overrides good faith’, it is essential to develop and to obtain the technology and 
the capacity to be able to defend oneself but also to show that one has the willingness to have it and 
to use it in case it is necessary (Idem, 2008). The key word is ‘dissuasion’.   
 In order to be able to ‘dissuade’ foreign entities as well as not falling behind in this rapidly 
changing world, Lula developed various partnerships that will help Brazil to accelerate the speed of 
its development. As Bruno Muxagato states, it is “this desire to enter the restricted circle of ‘First 
World’ countries that has led Brazil to […] signing the strategic partnership agreement with France’ 
(2009). As a result, in 2008, President Lula signed a strategic partnership with President Sarkozy that 
consisted in a collaboration between both states in “la construction et le développement de sous-
marins – y compris la coque d’un sous-marin nucléaire –, ou d’hélicoptères, dont la production sera 
progressivement transférée à Helibras, au Brésil” (Maurício Bustani, 2010: 396). The acquirement of 
four submarines and one nuclear propelled submarine through the strategic partnership with France 
is the first step forwards for Brazil towards the long-due modernization of the navy. For a country 
such as Brazil that has around 8.500 km of coastline, having a modern and efficient navy is crucial. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned in a public lecture on ‘The Brazilian Navy and its Challenges’ given by 
Professor João Roberto Martins Filho at Leiden University on the 20th of April 2015, for a very long 
period of time, Brazil did not have the technology to develop its own ships and thus depended on 
foreign technology. Therefore, during the 20th century, the Brazilian navy would evolve with little 
‘leaps’ in technology. As a result, one that can still be observed today, for an emerging country, 
Brazil’s navy has been stagnant or under-developed (2015). 
The decision to turn to France to build these submarines and to modernize its navy is an 
extremely strategic one made by Lula. Even though it can be up for discussion, France is still seen as a 
powerful country despite the fact that it has been surpassed by others in many areas. As a nuclear 
power, France has acquired throughout the years significant research and technology expertise that 
makes it today a very reliable and demanded partner. Nevertheless, one of the main reasons why 
Brazil chose France in this case, in addition to its savoir-faire, was also its willingness to share it. 
Muxagato explains that “in Lula’s view, France is the only country ready to guarantee Brazil’s 
independence by agreeing to share constructions secrets” (2009). Being a partner instead of merely 
being a buying customer changes not only the rapport between both states but also the speed of the 
acquiring nation’s development. In BNSD, it is said explicitly that “partnerships with other countries 
will be attempted, aiming at developing the technology capacity and the making of national defense 
products to gradually rule out the need to purchase imported services and products” (BNSD, 2008). 
As a result, Brazil will be able to acquire, thanks to France, the knowledge and the technology much 
faster, which will accelerate Brazil’s ascension and influence around the globe. In addition, Brazil 
22 
 
made sure to not turn towards the US to acquire new technology in order to preserve and to extend 
its autonomy, ‘sans défier les États-Unis ouvertement’ (Du Luart, 2009).  
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Brazil is not the only one that benefits from 
this partnership. There are many advantages for France as well, but three of them stand out: the 
advantages for its economy, global image and the propagation of its values. Even though Brazil is not 
a ‘customer’, it is still investing an important amount of money in this partnership that will directly 
stimulate the French defense industry “en faisant beneficier l’industrie francaise de facteurs de 
croissance et de reliance d’investissement” (Melo and Dini, 2013: 1). Furthermore, deepening its 
economic relation with Brazil gives an opportunity for France to establish “des alternatives 
d’exportation et des partneriats Nord-Sud dans une phase de compression budgetaire de l’Europe” 
(Idem: 2). However, from a diplomatic aspect, associating with an emerging peaceful and reliable 
country such as Brazil would most likely put France in a positive light and re-enforce its own global 
image as a reliable and beneficial partner. This association would also help France to promote its 
democratic values and the global vision it shares with Brazil, especially this vision of a multilateral 
world (Du Luart, 2009: 2).  
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, the strategic partnership with an industrialized country such as 
France is a decisive step for Brazil in the fulfillment of its global ambitions. With the decline of the US 
added to the rise of many emerging countries, the international system is moving forwards towards a 
multipolar one in which more countries will be able to increase their influence and voice their 
opinions on global issues. Even though it is safe to say that Brazil logistically seems to meet the 
criteria of a global player, the importance of this partnership as well as the modernization of Brazil’s 
navy is crucial for the development of the armed forces and the securitization of its maritime 
territory. The added developed technology as well as the military power will, in the long run, give 
additional weight to Brazil by not only making it a military power as well as a diplomatic and political 
power, but also by solidifying its leadership incentive in several regions, notably the South American 
one and the South Atlantic one. In addition, by choosing France as a partner, Brazil increases its 
global autonomy by stepping further away from the United States and by stepping closer to being 
more technologically independent. The capital invested in this strategic partnership will thus 
ultimately give more importance to Brazil in the global decision making process and more prestige to 
France on the global stage.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis looked at the issue of the imbalance between the use of soft power and hard 
power in Brazilian foreign policy and the reasons why the strategic partnership with France is of great 
significance for Brazil and the protection of both its sovereignty and natural resources. Having 
primarily resorted to soft power in its foreign policy, Brazil has cultivated fruitful relations with 
numerous nations and has managed to concretize its position as regional leader in both the South 
American region as well as the South Atlantic one. As Nye mentioned, soft power is an efficient tool 
to help increase one’s sphere of influence and to obtain more diplomatic strength and credibility 
(2004: 5). Nevertheless, for a country as Brazil that has ambitious international goals and a vast 
territory, it also needs hard power in order to be eligible to obtain the status of advanced country 
and to sustain a certain amount of control at its borders. Brazil, having solely relied on soft power, 
has neglected its military strength and therefore doesn’t have the military capacities that are usually 
linked to the idea of what makes a global actor. However, due to the need to securitize the Blue 
Amazon and its resources as well as to be able to dissuade any foreign nation to meddle in the affairs 
of the South Atlantic region, it was vital for Brazil to develop its navy and to rapidly acquire advanced 
technology. The strategic partnership with France in particular stands out because it answers to 
those needs. Through this partnership, France has agreed to not only assist Brazil in the construction 
of conventional and nuclear-propelled submarines but also to transfer its savoir-faire and technology. 
Nevertheless, this thesis mainly focuses on the ‘under the surface’ aspect of the modernization of the 
Brazilian navy. Therefore, an extended research on its ‘above the surface’ navy would be necessary in 
order to have a more complete and comprehensive idea on the modernization of the Brazilian navy 
and its goals. 
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